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IN THE SUPRDIE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RTCHAIWG. FOOTE, SHIRLEY 
P. FOOTE, and VENICE THEATRE 
COIU'ORAT I ON, 
vs. 
Plainti fls and 
Hespondent, 
NEWTON A. TAYLOR, 
De f <•ndan t and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 16533 
-------·-------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEHENT OF FACTS 
On August 7, 1978, respond~nts, Richard G. Foote and Shirley P. 
Foote (Foote), agreed t ll and appellant Newton A. Taylor (Taylor) 
agreed to buy the restaurant and theatre equipment located in the Venice 
Pizza Hut and Venice Theatre. This action concerns sale and lease of 
businesses located in Nephi, Otah, generally known as the Venice Theatre 
and the Venice House of Pizza. The real estate in which the businesses 
opPrat<' is owned by the Venice Theatre Corporation, a Utah Corporation, 
and the business equipment is owned by Richard G. Foote and Shirley P. 
Foote. The corporation and these individuals had listed this property 
for sale with Woodriver Realty, of Provo, Utah in the Spring of 1978. 
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The defendant Newton A. Taylor was employed as a salesman by l<oodriver 
Realty and became acquainted with the property in such capacity. The 
dt•tails of tl1is agrPenJent were set out in an Earnest Money l!cceipt and 
Offer to Purchase which was signed by both Foote and Taylor. The purchase 
price for the equipment was $40,000. This amount was payable as follows: 
$1,000 down at the signing of the agreement, $5500 on or before October 15, 
1978, $3500 on or before February 15, 1979. TI1e remaining $30,000 was 
to be amortized over 15 years at 9 per cent interest. The resulting 
monthi~ payments were to be $304.29 with the initial payment due on 
August 15, 1978. This agreement in pertinent part stated that the down 
pay111cnt of "$1000 is non-refundable if buyer is unable to perform on 
contract." 
Four days later, Venice Theatre Corpore1t ion grantPd the defendant 
Taylor a lease with an option to purchase. This lee1se and option concerned 
the real estate where the restaurant and theatre were located. The required 
monthly lease payment was $240 payable on the fifteenth day of each month. 
The lessee was allowed a credit of $35 per month due to the fact that the 
lessor was receiving that amount from another tenant 1n the building. 
Among other things, the lease stated, "In case of failure to faithfully 
perform the terms and covenants herein set forth, the defaulting party 
shall pay all costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees resulting 
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At the time the lease was entered into, the roof over part of 
the restaurant area was in need of repair. Respondent verbally acknowledged 
responsibility for the cost of such repair. Appellant, a contractor, was 
given the option of performing the work himself and deducting the cost 
thereof from the lease payment or obtaining a bid elsewhere. (T. at 74 and 76) 
Deciding that he w;~s too busy to fix the roof himself, appell;~nt n·ceived 
an estimate from a qualified roofer. However, this estimate was never 
submitted to respondent. 
By October 15, the parties were deadlocked over the issue of the 
roof: appellant refused to make either lease or purchase payments until the 
roof was repaired, and respondent refused to make repairs until he received 
the payments or assurance that they would be made if the repairs were 
completed. Communication deteriorated until the parties sought legal advice. 
In a telephone conversation on October 18, respondent's attorney was 
informed by appellant's attorney that the $5500 payment was in his trust 
fund and would be paid upon the completion of the roof repair. (T. at 16 and 146) 
Relying on this information, respondent contracted for the roof to be 
fixed. Work on the roof commenced the week of October 24th and was completed 
on Saturday, October 28th - the date of a Halloween extravaganza at the 
theatre sponsored by appellant. (T. at 100) Without notice, appellant 
vacated the premises on or after October 31, 1978. In addition, appellant 
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During the term of his occupancy, appellant made two lease payments. 
No payment was ever made on the equipment. Throughout the period appellant 
operated the theatre and made a profit from that activity. (T. at 91) 
Immediately after taking possession of the restaurant, appellant began 
extensive remodeling of the kitchen area. All of the sinks and a pl3stcr 
wall were removed. All electrical equipment including grills, heating 
elements, and water heaters had been disconnected. Only the pizza ovens 
were left intact. Cupboards only six years old had been rcmovpd 3nd carted 
to the Nephi dump. At no time did respondent give appellant permission 
to remodel or dispose u[ items within the restaurant. Upon re-('ntry, 
respondent found the kitchen which had been operational at the time the 
lease·was signed to be nearly dismantled. (T. at 23 and 61-62) The cost 
to restore the kitchen to working order was estimated to be at least 
$1500. (T. at 27) 
\~ilea tenant, appellant caused the locks of the building to be 
changed. The only keys were not given to respondent until after December 
16, 1978. (T. at 82) Without access to the building, respondent was unable 
to properly winterize the premises. During a cold spell, some of the 
pipes froze and broke. The cost to repair this damage was over $900. 
Neither the keys nor the premises were ever voluntarily surrendered 
to respondent. Only by obtaining a court order on December 6, 1978, was 
respondent able to re-enter and retake control of the property. Upon 
re-taking the building, respondent sought to rPlet the premises so as to 
mitigate further damage. 
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. 
.. , 
orl' November 2, 1978, respondent filed suit for damages in 
Fourth J
1
udicial District Court and prayed for judgment tn the amount 
I 




DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After hearing the case, the Honorable David Sam, District Judge, 
found tl.:•l appellant had br<'achcd the purchase contract anti the- lL'aS<' 
agre-ement. That there was no merger of the agreements. The Court 
found that respondent had suffered damages in the amount of $2,052.16 
due t<> the loss of fair rental of the bui !ding and equipment; judged 
that r• .pondent be allowed to retain as equitable compensation for 
damagv to the pizza parlor, $1000, and awarded $1150 as reasonable 
attornf"/,1 B fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE LEASE AND PURCHASE 
AGREEMENTS DID NOT MERGE, SINCE THERE WAS NO UNITY AS TO 
SUBJECT, TIME AND PARTIES. 
Although appellant maintains as his first point that the Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and the Lease Agreement were not 
separate agreements, but rather merged into one contract, this conclusion is 
incorrect. Appellant relies on Harty v. Hoerner as support for his contention. 
-5-
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1 
The holding of that case in its entirety is: 
"Hhere different writings relating to the same st~bject are 
executed at the same tjme between the same' parties, a 
fundamental principle of construction requires they be 
treated as one and the same Lnstrument.,. 
170 Colo. 506, 463 P.2d 313,314 (1969). 
In other words, in order to effect a merger of writings, there must be 
a sameness of: !)subject, 2) time, 3) parties. In this case the 
purchase agreement differs from the lease agreement in these significant 
and controlling points: a) there arc two separate parties, i .c. 
Venice Theatre Corporation as to the lease agreement; Richard G. Foote 
and Shirley P. Foote as to the purchase agreement; b) they were not 
executed at the same time, i.e. the lease August 11, 1978, the purchase 
agreement August 7, 1978; c) the two writings concerned different subjects, 
i.e. the lease, real property and the purchase agrec•ment, person,llty; 
d) no unity in time of performance, i.e. the purchase agreement was to 
extend over a period of fifteen years while the lease would expire in three; 
e) no unity in consideration. 
This situation 1s clearly distinguishable from the facts in Harty. 
In that case, plaintiff loaned $5000 to a company of which defendant was 
president. A promissory note and a subordination agreement were signed 
simultaneously. The company defaulted on the note and plaintiff sought to 
hold defendant personally liable. The subordination agreement expressly 
stated that defendant was only signing in his capacity as president and 
that thf' compnny was principally liable. 11H• court held that thvrt• was 
-()-
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a merger since both the note and the subordination agreement clearly 
concerned the same subject - the loan of the $5000. The subordination 
ugrcemcnt \V.:ls held necessary to explain the relationship of the parties. 
In Reid v. Johnson, a California Court was faced with a situation 
n•markably simiL.Jr to the cast~ at hancl. 111rce documt•nts, two concerning 
tilt' ll'a:;l·r of rl'al propc•rty and one concerning the sail' of personal 
property to be used in conjunction with the realty, were executed on or 
about the same day. It was appellant's contention that the various 
writings should be read as one contract. The Court, however, stated: 
"It is therefore the general rule that two or more separately 
executed ,instruments may be considered and construed as one 
contract only when upon their face they deal "ith the same 
subject matter and are by reference to one another so connected 
that they may be fairly said to be interdependent." 
85 Cal. App. 2d 112,116, 192 P.2d 106, 108 (1948). 
Upon examination of the agreements, the court found that the contracts 
did not make reference to the subject matter of each other. It stated: 
"Whether we take them together or separately, it is difficult 
to see how they can be construed together as one contract, when 
each appears to be a separate, independent agreement." 
85 Cal. App. 2d 112, 116, 192 P.2d 106, 109. 
Likewise 1n the present case, the lease makes no reference to the 
subject matter of the equipment purchase or vice versa. They are not 
interdependent; each is a separate independent contract. 
A definition of merger may be helpful at this point. Construing 
contempor.1nPous instruments together simply means that if there are any 
provisions in one instrument limiting, explaining, or otherwise affecting 
-7-
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the provisions of another, they will be given effect. This does not 
mean that the provisions of one instrument are imported bodily into 
another, contrary to the intent of the parties; they may be intended 
to be separate instruments and to provide for entirely different things. 
See Sterling Colorado Agency, Inc., v. Sterling Insurance Company, 
266 F.2d 472,476(10th Cir. 1959). Moreover, the court in Sterling stated: 
"Considering sevt•r:ll instruments as one is not tlu..• n3tural 
construction, and 1s resorted to only to effcctuat(~ thl' 
intention. 11 
266 F .2d at 476. 
In the present case, there has been no showing that the provisions 
1n one instrument were intended to explain or limit the provisions of 
the other. The instruments were prepared by the appellant, who, through 
acting for himself, was also acting for Woodriver Realty. Consequently, 
they should be considered independent agreements. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE JUDGMENT OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES. 
It should first be noted if the judgment of the lower court that 
there werP two separate agreements is affirmed, this argument is 
superfluous. Since a liquidated damages clause is contained only 1n 
the equipment purchase agreement, it could not be used to limit respondent's 
recovery on the lease agreement. 
Moreover, it should also be noted that in his judgment, the 
trial judge stated in respect to the down payment, "Judgment allowing the 
-8-
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plaintiff to retain as equitable compensation for damage to the Pizza 
parlor, $1000 down payment made on the purchase thereof." The judge 
mntlt' no mc•ntion of tlH! money as ] iquidated datn<lgcs. R.athcr the money 
was to go to pay for damages which accrued to the restaurant kitchen as 
a result of appellant's unauthorized remodeling. 
Appellant testified he vacated the premises on October 31, 1978. 
(T. at 109) Respondent's complaint was filed November 2, !978. Surely 
the mcrP p~ssugc of one day between breach and filing cannot b~ seen as 
uncquivocable election on the part of the respondent to retain the down 
payment as his remedy. Rather it would seem that 1n immediately filing 
suit, respondent had elected to seek damages in a court of law. The 
judge noted this fact at trial. (T. at 103) Case law is in harmony 
with this proposition. In Walden v. Backus, the court ruled that it did 
not have to even consider the question of liquidated damages since '~y 
filing this action the sellers elected to seek actual damage clause of 
the agreement." 81 Nev. 634,408 P.2d 712,714 (1965). 
In any event, if this particular money is taken to constitute 
·,J liqui-clc~ted damages, it should be noted that liquidated damages only 
compensate for injury due to breach of contract. A liquidated damages 
clause should not limit respondent's claims sounding in tort. 
It cannot seriously be contended that respondent failed to prove 
any actual damage to the restaurant as a result of appellant's actions. 
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appellant had turned an operational restaurant into shambles. (T. at 23 
and 61-62) Appellant himself admitted he failed to complete the work he 
hnd started. (T. at 124-125) 
At trial, respondent presented an estimate of the cost to repair 
the kitchl•n. Appellant objected to the introduction of that cvidencl' 
and attorney for respondent laid additional foundation for the evidence. 
There was no further objection. Appellant should not be allowed now to 
complain of its introduction. 
Moreover, appellant has consistently maintained that the $1000 
award is liquidated damagl's. llowever, it is precisely in situations 
where damages are speculative, indefinite, or uncertain, that an award 
of stipulated damages is appropriate. The Colorado Supreme Court stated: 
"One of the essential elements to the enforcement of a contract 
for retention of a sum paid as liquidated damages 1s that the 
damages to be anticipated are uncertain in amount or difficult to 
be proved." 
Grooms v. Rice, 163 Colo. 234, 429 P.2d 298, 300 (1967). 
The uncertainty of actual damages occasioned by a breach of contract is 
immaterial. Rather, the amount of liquidated damages is presumed to 
be the amount of damage, King v. Oakley, 434 P.2d 868 (Okla. 1967) 
unless disproportionate to any possible loss that might have been 
contemplated, so that to enforce it would shock the conscience of the 
Court. Tennent v. Leary, 82 Ariz. 67, 308 P.2d 693 (1957). 
The lease agreement which was signed by appellant stated that 
the defaulting party would pay reasonable attorney's fees resulting from 
-10-
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the enforcement of any right ar1s1ng out of a breach of the agreement. 
Appellant does not contend that the amount of the fee is unreasonable or 
that respondent did not breach the agreement. Rather he maintains that 
there was no necessity for incurring them and respondent was not 
justified 1n his demands. Interestingly enough, in appellant's 
counter-claim he also prayed for an award of reasonable attorney's fees. 
(T. at 145) 
The rule in most jurisdictions is that a provision in a contract 
for attorney's fees in event of breach is valid. Utah has adhered to 
this rule early on. See McCurnick v. Swem, 36 Utah 6, 102 !'. 626(1909). 
Such a provision is regarded as a reasonable provision for reimbursement 
or indemnity to the creditor against the expenses incident to a default 
on the part of the debtor. Some cases base the rule on the conceded right 
of parties to make their contracts in whatever form they please, provided 
they conform to the law of the land. See McClain v. Continental Supply Co., 
66 Okla. 225, 168 P. 815 (1917). 
TI1is view was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in TI1atcher v. 
Industrial Commission where it stated, the judiciary "has the power to 
determine what is reasonable when the law or the contract of the parties 
provides for a reasonable fee." 115 Utah 568, 575, 207 P.2d 181 0949). 
-11-
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CONCLUSION 
lkcause2 the plaintiffs did establish the2 cxistcnc<' of two agreements, 
breach thereof by appellant, and because the evidence was sufficient to 
establish the damage sustained as result of the breach, respondent asks 
that the judgment of the Court below be affirmed. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent was mailed first-class, postage prepaid to: 
Mr. D. John Musselman, Attorney for Appellant, at 1325 South BOO East, 
Suite 115, Orem, Utah 84057, on this ~day of November, 1980. 
'"seEta~· .Q .&• v.a~Q__ 
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